Toward a radically embodied neuroscience of attachment and relationships by Lane Beckes et al.
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 21 May 2015
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00266
Edited by:
Andrew D. Wilson,
Leeds Beckett University, UK
Reviewed by:
Jeffrey L. Krichmar,
University of California, Irvine, USA
Eric Phillip Charles,
The Pennsylvania State University,
USA
*Correspondence:
Lane Beckes,
Department of Psychology, Bradley
University, 1501 West Bradley
Avenue, Peoria, IL 61625, USA
lbeckes@bradley.edu
Received: 25 April 2014
Accepted: 23 April 2015
Published: 21 May 2015
Citation:
Beckes L, IJzerman H and Tops M
(2015) Toward a radically embodied
neuroscience of attachment
and relationships.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 9:266.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00266
Toward a radically embodied
neuroscience of attachment and
relationships
Lane Beckes1*, Hans IJzerman2,3 and Mattie Tops2
1 Department of Psychology, Bradley University, Peoria, IL, USA, 2 Department of Clinical Psychology, VU University
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 3 Tilburg School of Behavioral and Social Sciences, Tilburg University, Tilburg,
Netherlands
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982) posits the existence of internal working models
as a foundational feature of human bonds. Radical embodied approaches instead
suggest that cognition requires no computation or representation, favoring a cognition
situated in a body in an environmental context with affordances for action (Chemero,
2009; Barrett, 2011; Wilson and Golonka, 2013; Casasanto and Lupyan, 2015).
We explore whether embodied approaches to social soothing, interpersonal warmth,
separation distress, and support seeking could replace representational constructs
such as internal working models with a view of relationship cognition anchored in the
resources afforded to the individual by their brain, body, and environment in interaction.
We review the neurobiological bases for social attachments and relationships and
attempt to delineate how these systems overlap or don’t with more basic physiological
systems in ways that support or contradict a radical embodied explanation. We suggest
that many effects might be the result of the fact that relationship cognition depends
on and emerges out of the action of neural systems that regulate several clearly
physically grounded systems. For example, the neuropeptide oxytocin appears to
be central to attachment and pair-bond behavior (Carter and Keverne, 2002) and is
implicated in social thermoregulation more broadly, being necessary for maintaining a
warm body temperature (for a review, see IJzerman et al., 2015b). Finally, we discuss
the most challenging issues around taking a radically embodied perspective on social
relationships. We find the most crucial challenge in individual differences in support
seeking and responses to social contact, which have long been thought to be a function
of representational structures in the mind (e.g., Baldwin, 1995). Together we entertain
the thought to explain such individual differences without mediating representations or
computations, but in the end propose a hybrid model of radical embodiment and internal
representations.
Keywords: attachment, embodied cognition, interpersonal relationships, thermoregulation, neurobiology,
oxytocin, ecological psychology
Toward a Radically Embodied Neuroscience of Attachment
and Close Relationships?
People’s most intimate connections are bound to their earliest social interactions. These have
been suggested to lead to internal working models of people’s social world. Or so attachment
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theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982; see also Craik, 1943) has suggested.
Highly inﬂuential, innovative, and integrative, the theory has
grown to be one of the most generative theories of interpersonal
relationships in psychology and human development.
Accordingly it has provided a basis for strong claims about
the nature of human relationships and human cognition. Some
of those claims, such as the claim that humans are innately
social animals, and that being social has consequences for mental
and physical well-being, are nigh indisputable given the current
support (e.g., Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Holt-Lunstad et al.,
2010; Beckes and Coan, 2011).
Other claims, however, such as the idea that people develop
internal working models of their relationships and that those
models inﬂuence behavior from cradle to grave are more
debatable and our understanding of the processes that lead
up the formation of such internal working models are still
in their rudimentary phases. Many relationship theories that
spring from attachment theories either explicitly posit or
imply representational schemata or computational thought
(e.g., Baldwin, 1992; Agnew et al., 1998; Andersen and
Chen, 2002; Simpson, 2007). Here we entertain the thought
that, in many instances, the cognitive neuroscience and
psychology of relationships does not require representational
cognition by “putting brain, body, and social relationships
together again” (cf. Clark, 1998; see also Hendriks-Jansen,
1996). Notably, our primary goal with this article is not to
argue that all attachment processes are necessarily radically
embodied, but rather to present support for the radical view,
taking this possibility as far as we can. We thus make the
case that radically embodied approaches have the potential
to beneﬁt the study of attachment processes through the
presentation of considerable research on the neurobiological side
of attachment behavior that ﬁts well within that framework.
Further, we wish to make the case that the most fruitful
approach to attachment might be one that includes both non-
representational approaches and representational approaches.
We end the article by framing the brain as having evolved
in such a way that the representational architecture of
the brain is scaﬀolded “on top of” non-representational
cognition, which should thus be situated to a greater degree,
and also constrained by environmental stimuli to a greater
degree.
To examine both normative and individual diﬀerences’
facets of relationship psychology from a radically embodied
cognitive neuroscience perspective we will review empirical
ﬁndings from both animal models and human investigations
of interpersonal behavior and neurobiology. Our goal is to
discover the “cognitive architecture” for attachment starting with
non-representational approaches such as Gibsonian (Gibson,
1979) ecological psychology and traditional behaviorist learning
approaches (e.g., Skinner, 1953). We will brieﬂy deﬁne how
we interpret the non-representational cognition and radically
embodied cognitive neuroscience perspectives (see, Chemero,
2009; Barrett, 2011; Wilson and Golonka, 2013) and framing
this from an attachment perspective (Bowlby, 1969/1982) and its
modern perspectives (e.g., Hazan and Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer
and Shaver, 2003).
Then, we will discuss support for the idea that the body –
and its corresponding neural activations – plays a crucial
part in interpersonal interactions, leaning heavily on the
animal literature to describe sensory pathways through which
social interaction inﬂuences psychological and physiological
functioning (e.g., Hofer, 2006), and tie this literature with the
sparser work in the human neurosciences related to interpersonal
processes (e.g., Coan et al., 2006). We will suggest that many
attachment phenomena can be understood as a dynamic
coupling of the organism to its environment in which researchers’
interpretation via representational processes may be unnecessary
(and perhaps even incorrect), simply relying on the organism’s
homeostatic process. In order to take this radical embodi-
ment view as far as we can, we will entertain the idea that many
neural processes relating to individually variant attachment
styles can be understood through their ties with the body.
Subsequently we will reveal fundamental links between bodily
states and relationship cognitions (e.g., IJzerman and Semin,
2009, 2010) with a discussion – and a framing through a radical
embodiment lens – on work done on what some may term
conceptual embodiment. In so doing, we will discuss Zajonc
and Markus’ (1984) dichotomy between soft and hard interfaces
of cognition, but will also suggest the theory of predictive and
reactive control systems (PARCSs; Tops et al., 2010) to elucidate
how representational cognition may emerge from more basic,
radically embodied cognitive systems, providing an integration
of non-representational approaches and representational
approaches at the neural level. In the end, we will suggest a
research agenda that might falsify positions we set forth here.
Basic Principles of Radically Embodied
Cognition
The primary goal of radically embodied cognitive perspectives
is to understand various psychological processes in the most
parsimonious way possible (in this case questioning whether the
mediation of any additional representational mechanisms are
obsolete; Chemero, 2009; Barrett, 2011; Wilson and Golonka,
2013). Chemero (2009) oﬀers one approach to this problem
by oﬀering some key identiﬁers of radical embodiment versus
representation. Chemero’s approach is eliminitavist in nature
(cf. Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988), rooted in the American
functionalism of James (1884). A contrasting strain of thought
is representationalism, rooted in the German structuralist
school of Wilhelm Wundt. One major component that
diﬀers between the two is whether the mind is composed of
individual parts that represent the world. Chemero (2009)
identiﬁes the representionalist position as involving internal
representations upon which people perform mental gymnastics.
Eliminitavists wonder whether the mind’s, and therefore
cognition’s, primary task is something entirely diﬀerent from
“construction, manipulation, and use of representations of
the world” (Chemero, 2009, p. 18). In this sense, radical
embodiment can be understood primarily through its rejection
of mediating representations, and its embrace of the idea that
explanations should look to the dynamic coupling of information
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in the environment, sensory experience, body features, and
opportunities for behavior. Moreover, once all constraints within
this system are known, those constraints provide suﬃcient infor-
mation to guide action, without the need for complex calculation.
Skinner’s (1953) brand of behaviorism is perhaps the most
well-known eliminitavist approach. Skinner took a relatively
agnostic position in regards to the nature of representations,
instead focusing on processes that were easily observable and
measurable. Following the cognitive revolution, Gibson’s (1979)
ecological psychology carried the eliminitavist banner. Chemero
(2009) notes that Gibson proposed three major ideas. First,
perception is direct and internal information need not be
computed or represented to go from sensation to perception. In
this sense external stimuli are presented, not re-presented (like a
radio presents the light information from radio waves as sounds
created by a vibrating speaker cone). External sensations may
change form, as in transduction, but the information contained
in the external agent is the same as the information presented in
the perceiver’s nervous system.
Second, similar to James’ (1884) view on action, perception
should be for doing, as perception primarily serves the functional
act of achieving behavior. Thus, people viewing their partner as
sad may notice (consciously or not) changes in their sympathetic
nervous system, which moves them to act to sooth their partner.
Third, because perception should be direct and because it is
able to produce functional behavior, the environment must
contain all necessary information for an organism to engage
in adaptive behavior (cf. Griﬃths and Scarantino, 2009). More
speciﬁcally, Gibson (1979) suggested that people directly perceive
aﬀordances of action opportunities, like soothing or retaliating
against another, present in the current environment in a matter
speciﬁed by the direct information in the environment. This
approach allows the organism to collect information rich sensory
input and use that information to guide action in a manner that
does not require the mediation of representational constructs
or computations. In this sense perception is primarily of
information, which can be used to perceive aﬀordances available
in the current environment.
But how does this work in interpersonal relationships?
We will attempt to discuss the radically embodied cognitive
neuroscience of attachment and relationship processes primarily
by specifying the biological and environmental stimuli that
constrain those processes. Further, by adopting the premises
of ecological psychology and behaviorism, we will entertain
the thought of radically embodied mechanisms for explaining
attachment relationships. We believe that these approaches could
be fruitful for understanding relationship processes regardless of
the “true” nature of the human mind, in particular shifting from
the typical self-focused nature of social psychology to a more
dynamic relationship-focused nature of cognitive systems.
Starting Assumptions of Attachment
Theory
Attachment theory proposes that relationships serve functions
that solve problems related to evolutionary pressures. In
attachment theory, an “attachment system” is the primary
motivator for the bonds that tie children to their parents. The
term “attachment system” is a bit of a misnomer, because
Bowlby (1969/1982) described instead the coordination and
action of multiple instinctive systems. The primary proximal
function of each instinct is the maintenance of proximity
to the child’s primary caregiver. What begins as individual
instinctive behaviors with the same general function, over time
(i.e., by 18 months of age) get coordinated into “sophisticated
goal-corrected systems” (Bowlby, 1969/1982, p. 180), which
eﬀectively coordinate behavior to reach the desired end state.
Hallmark behaviors include suckling, clinging, crying, smiling,
and following, all in the service of drawing the caregiver closer
to provide warmth and security. This keeps the child safe from
predation and isolation, which holds with it the risk of starvation
and injury. In addition to such survival beneﬁts, proximity
maintenance also seems to fulﬁll a secondary function of aﬀect
and physiological regulation, which may promote exploration
and aﬃliation, leading to better reproductive ﬁtness (see Zeifman
and Hazan, 2008).
In children, the attachment system is activated by distressing
circumstances (Bowlby, 1969/1982), including separation from
caregivers, illness, injury, pain, and fear (e.g., due to the
presence of a predator). The activation of the system motivates
proximity seeking or maintaining behavior. Generally the system
is deactivated, and attachment behaviors are terminated, through
sight, sound, touch, and other forms of perceptual contact
with the caregiver. Once calmed, the child resumes exploratory
behavior until separation or another distressing event. Thus,
attachment theory at its core is about the very immediate, and
innately motivatedmanagement of proximity to caregivers on the
one hand, and exploration of the environment on the other.
In the last 30 years scholars have made serious attempts
to extend attachment theory to adult relationships. Seminally,
Hazan and Shaver (1987) asserted that the attachment system
is partially responsible for the adult romantic bond. Indeed,
multiple parallels have been drawn between behavior in infant-
caregiver interactions and adult romantic partner interactions.
Zeifman and Hazan (2008) oﬀer a fairly extensive account
noting the similarities in coordinative systems (such as nuzzling,
kissing, suckling, ventral–ventral contact, and mutual eye gaze)
and stages of separation (i.e., protest, despair, and detachment;
Bowlby, 1980; Hazan and Shaver, 1992). We continue now into
a representational approach, and reinterpret these ﬁndings to
frame them with a departure point from the radical view.
Is Attachment Radically Embodied?
In the past decades, social psychology has seen a revival
in studying the importance of the body in a host of
diﬀerent processes. These processes have been studied from
a perspective relying on soft and hard representations of the
external environment. Such hard representations are the direct
consequence of the stimulus in the external environment, while
soft representations are postulated as cognitively mediated or
appraisal processes that cause the phenomenological experience
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related to the external stimulus, without this stimulus being
present. In regards to attachment processes, in humans there is
growing support relating temperature cues to close relationships.
Often, these eﬀects are related to what one may call “conceptual
embodiment,” of which Lakoﬀ and Johnson’s (1999) account
of conceptual metaphors is a typical example (see also Landau
et al., 2010). In brief, the conceptual metaphor view postulates
that people co-experience an abstract concept and concrete
experience, and from thereon form internal models that combine
the aspect of experience and concept to imbue meaning to their
social world (an idea that was antedated by Asch, 1958, early
writings).
A compelling possibility regarding the embodiment of
attachment and relationship processes is the potential that
relationship cognition is fundamentally linked to the body’s
regulation of body temperature. In contrast to Lakoﬀ and
Johnson’s (1999) conceptual embodiment account, IJzerman and
Koole (2011) suggested that conceptual metaphors that invoke
physical descriptions for non-physical ideas might not have a
representational structure as normally conceived in cognitive
science, and instead rely on prepared physiological processes.
Although at an intuitive level one may expect that warmth and
aﬀection are provided structure through distinct areas in the
brain (as postulated by metaphor theories), it is more likely
that we can interpret these earlier results through the radical
embodiment lens.
One admirable aspect of Lakoﬀ and Johnson’s (1999) theory is
that it includes a falsiﬁable prediction, by claiming that the eﬀect
of concrete experiences ﬂow onto abstract target dimensions only
(and not vice versa). Speciﬁcally, IJzerman and Koole (2011)
explained that this aspect of their theory was not true for warmth
related eﬀects (see also Lee and Schwarz, 2012; for skepticism
of this view), as they discuss ﬁndings showing that relationship
warmth has an eﬀect on the perception of ambient temperature
(for original studies and replications, see Zhong and Leonardelli,
2008; IJzerman and Semin, 2010; Szymkow et al., 2013; IJzerman
et al., 2015a; for a notable non-replication, see Ebersole et al.,
2015). As an alternative to Lakoﬀ and Johnson’s model, IJzerman
and Koole (2011) identiﬁed Barsalou’s (1999, 2008) perceptual
symbol systems (PSSs) as a rival candidate for attachment-related
processes regarding underlying psychological processes in which
concepts are built in perceptual systems through simulations
relying on perceptual elements.
The PSS view may ﬁrst rely on very basic social
thermoregulatory mechanisms. That is, IJzerman et al. (2012)
found that skin temperature might account for some of the
eﬀects that have been obtained earlier. That is, after a brief period
of social exclusion, skin temperature of participants decreased
(while negative aﬀect typically so experienced after rejection
could also be alleviated via a warm cup of tea). Note that the
exact relationships between skin temperature and temperature
perceptions have not been settled, but we do know that people
with a lower skin temperature perceive drops in temperature
more quickly.
Thermoregulatory accounts seem to apply more broadly and
may antedate the workings of the “simulator.” That is, Fransson
et al. (2005) found that babies have smaller diﬀerences between
skin temperature and core temperature when being held (vs.
when not) potentially preventing hypothermia. Additionally,
skin-to-skin contact leads the feet of neonates (that were skin-
to-skin, as compared to those that were removed from the skin
of the mother and swaddled) to have a greater increase in skin
temperature (Bystrova et al., 2007; for a summary see IJzerman
et al., 2015b). In other words, many of the processes that may
previously have been attributed to “conceptual embodiment”
may well be attributable to relatively simple changes in skin
temperature – a factor crucial in animals’ regulation of body
temperature and something that IJzerman et al. (2012) termed
an “evolved simulator.” As such, homeostatic systems may
serve as embodied signals for relationship states, requiring no
mediating representations. We contend that such a link between
relationship cognition and sensory perception is rooted in an
evolved link between energy regulation and social contact.
The Organism’s Most Essential Goals
and Needs: The Regulation of Energy
Attachment may be radically embodied because it has evolved
to serve the homeostatic needs of the organism. Speciﬁcally,
social animals appear to leverage social relationships as an
eﬃcient method of regulating homeostasis and energy use.
Therefore, attachment may be primarily embodied to support
these homeostatic systems. Before we address the issue of
homeostasis, why would the regulation of homeostasis be tied to
properties of the attachment system? We rely on social baseline
theory (SBT; cf. Proﬃtt, 2006; Beckes and Coan, 2011) to provide
us with a ﬁrst premise that may help us answer this question.
Social baseline theory relies on two basic principles. First,
metabolic resources are regulated more eﬃciently when done
jointly. Second, the organism relies on aﬀordances that help
with regulating this “social baseline.” This latter fact is an
acknowledgment that the natural human ecological niche is
not a primarily physical, but instead a social niche (Brewer
and Caporael, 1990; Berscheid, 2003). Humans have adapted
to almost every terrestrial environment, primarily through
cooperative social behavior. Further, it is now clear that human
health is greatly enhanced when a person is embedded in a rich,
supportive social network, and greatly diminished by the lack
of such a network (Gallagher and Vella-Brodick, 2008; Beals
et al., 2009; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts, 2009; Holt-Lunstad et al.,
2010). Moreover, one can easily ﬁnd examples of individuals
that survive and even thrive without capabilities normally
considered fundamental. It is relatively easy to ﬁnd examples
of people who have disabilities related to sensation, such as
those who are blind or deaf, or movement such as those who
are paraplegic or quadriplegic, and are nonetheless well-adjusted
and healthy individuals. Alternatively, ﬁnding individuals who
are simultaneously well-adjusted, healthy, and socially isolated
is nearly impossible. But why does attachment relate to the
regulation of metabolic resources?
Biology necessitates that all organisms must use less energy
than they take in (cf. Proﬃtt, 2006), a simple principle referred
to as economy of action (see also, Stearns, 1992; Kaplan and
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Gangestad, 2005). The most important categories in animals’
lives relate to survival, growth, reproduction, and rearing. The
importance of each is dependent on an animal’s ecological niche
and evolved strategies for that niche. The concept that energy
must be distributed across these general categories of tasks
seems to be a core feature of evolutionary biology. Crucially,
humans appear to have developed an unique ecological niche,
one that is primarily social in nature (Beckes and Coan, 2011),
and requires heavy investment in oﬀspring (typically thought
of as K-selection; MacArthur and Wilson, 1967; Trivers, 1972).
SBT postulates that others help regulate metabolic resources,
both in dyadic relationships as well as throughout development.
Throughout development, the investment in oﬀspring requires
a sharp reduction in the quantity of oﬀspring that humans can
have over a lifetime, but with that tradeoﬀ in reproductive output
comes longer lifespans and greater likelihood that any given child
will survive to reproductive age and reproduce itself.
The idea that others regulate metabolic resources can be
understood from SBT’s second principle, namely the Gibsonian
suggestion that aﬀordances, at their core, are for action (James,
1884). But what do we mean by aﬀordances in the context of
attachment? Chemero (2009) deﬁnes the idea of aﬀordances as
relations between a feature of the environment and an animal’s
ability to act on that feature; formally: Aﬀords-φ (feature, ability).
In this case the attachment ﬁgure has features that might provide
support (e.g., softness, body heat, the capacity to defend the
individual because of numbers or size, arms and a trunk the child
can cling to and wrap around), and the person’s ability is directly
related to their capacity to elicit the type of support needed (e.g.,
eliciting soft caresses, eliciting huddling or holding behaviors,
eliciting defensive aggression toward predators or competitors).
This deﬁnition is useful in thinking about attachment in an
embodied context because it explicitly deﬁnes an aﬀordance as
a relation, in this case between an organism and the body of
another organism.
These principles are perhaps best illustrated by an empirical
demonstration based on Gibsonian aﬀordance principles. Proﬃtt
(2006) suggests that energy dynamics inﬂuence perception
through aﬀordance processes such that activities such as climbing
a hill are perceived as more diﬃcult if one is tired, weak, or
hauling a heavy backpack. First, Stefanucci et al. (2005) found
that wearing a heavy backpack made an uphill incline seem
steeper. This suggests the manner in which aﬀordances modify
perception of the environment in support of action. From our
attachment perspective, being alone is like wearing a heavy
backpack. Indeed, others help regulate metabolic resources, as
Schnall et al. (2008, see also Oishi et al., 2013) found that
having a friend nearby also reduced the perception of a slant
of a hill, and did so in a correlated manner with the length
of relationship. Thus, social proximity decreases costs of action
in the environment by diminishing vigilance and freeing up
metabolic and sensory resources from defensive processes for
exploration, social interaction, and resource gathering.
Beyond this previous example of why being alone may change
one’s perception, it is important to understand why exactly this
occurs. Why do social resources scale the perception of our
environment? The aﬀordances we cite are related directly to the
biological imperatives of the organism. These imperatives require
the organism to maintain a baseline across a variety of physical
and psychological resources and a crucial baseline is the social
one. Gross and Proﬃtt (2013) reasoned that perception is scaled
both by physiological and social resources, and information
regarding both types of resources are compared to baselines
to determine the costs and beneﬁts of engaging in any given
action. It is the – embodied – perception of information regarding
physiological and social resources, along with perception of the
physical situation that scales perception. If resources – including
social ones – are high, then action appears easier, scaling the
environment in a way that seems easier tomanage. If they are low,
then that scaling changes to make any given task appear more
diﬃcult.
From here we note that aﬀordances at their most basic
level are action opportunities. Moreover, they may represent
opportunities for a gain of some sort, or to avoid some real
or perceived danger (Sanders, 1997). Load sharing (Beckes
and Coan, 2011) is the primary mechanism by which social
resources are thought to alter human perceptions of the costs
of engaging in any particular action. Because humans have
primarily evolved to live in a social ecological niche, we assume
the presence of a familiar social network, which can help
to complete tasks, solve problems, and maintain homeostasis.
This likely evolved initially from adaptations inducing risk
distribution behavioral strategies; many animals will move in
herds, ﬂocks, or other groupings partly because the group oﬀers a
level of protection, reducing risk, and making the environment
appear easier to manage. In this sense we oﬄoad problem
solving and eﬀort to the group, reducing the cost of acting for
each individual member. This is because the group becomes
an emergent organism with a diﬀerent set of constraints and
abilities.
Based on the principles of economy of action and load
sharing, one can reason that individuals acting in concert,
synergistically, create a new perception-action system that cannot
be decomposed into its individual parts (see e.g., Marsh et al.,
2006; see also Marsh et al., 2009). As Marsh et al. (2006, p. 20)
note this creates a new unit of perception-action coupling.
Thus, social coordination emerges out of “maximizing the
patterns of information ﬂow required for a successful social
encounter.” Individuals will tend to synchronize their behavior
with the others in their environment for the purposes of social
interaction, relying on speech patterns, vocalizations (including
pitch, prosody, etc.), movement, and touch by others in service of
coordinating behavior.
Such optimization should be more eﬃcient with attachment
ﬁgures, leading to improved coordination and more eﬃcient
coupling. Think, for example, of a classic example provided
by Asch (1958), who described how two boys move an
obstacle that neither is capable of moving alone. He noted
that they carefully synchronize their behavior and adjust
for sudden movements of the other. In this case, it is more
reasonable to assume they are acting with a shared set of
aﬀordances, with perception-action coupling linked to one
another, and constrained by their combined abilities. In
other words, close coordination of attachment relations
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 266
Beckes et al. Radically embodied attachment
should be easily explained through non-representational
means via the features of normative attachment in
terms of sensory stimuli, environmental information, and
aﬀordances.
Beyond these relatively more complex social interactions,
others provide humans with a unique set of elementary
aﬀordances (Marsh et al., 2009). Among the problems these
aﬀordances might help solve are satisfying needs related to
warmth, protection, food, and sex. In order to work out our
idea further, we will now address some of the simplest pulls (not
focusing on more complex problems like cultural coordination)
onto the person from the social environment, that is, the
provision of resources that help solve basic problems in a variety
of manners (like providing body heat, breast milk, protection
from predation, and making tradeoﬀs in energy conservation).
Answering the Organism’s Metabolic
Needs: Core Functions of Homeostasis
Many of the problems that attachment solves are related to
energetic balance, and the organism can accomplish energetic
balance through homeostatic regulation. Thus, direct proximity
maintenance is critical to maintaining and/or reinstating the
aﬀordances of the social unit, allowing each individual animal
more ﬂexibility and capacity to meet their own homeostatic
needs. Nelson and Panksepp (1998) suggest an integrated social-
emotion system based on the neural circuitry supporting distress
vocalizations mediating separation distress and a complementary
social reward circuit mediating contact comfort. Speciﬁcally,
they suggest that mechanisms that sub-served thermo-regulation,
energy balance, and place-attachment were exapted for use in a
social engagement circuit and mechanisms for pain were exapted
for use in a separation distress circuit. From this perspective,
many of the core components of attachment behavior can
be understood as radically embodied, homeostatic systems. The
perception of aﬀordances thus serves to maintain neutrality in
those systems.
Assuming that attachment processes have exapted from more
primitive thermoregulatory, harm avoidance (e.g., pain), and
energy balance (e.g., nutritive and peripheral arousal control)
mechanisms, one can re-envision attachment as an embodied
system designed to maintain a balance between proximity
to familiar and predictable others, and exploration of the
environment. If the individual’s interoceptive, exteroceptive,
stress, and thermoregulatory states are at baseline, then
exploratory behavior is the norm. If not, then proximity seeking
should be the norm. From this perspective, the physiological
state of the person plays a central role in determining attachment
behavior. If true, then attachment behavior should be modiﬁable
via the manipulation of that physiological state as much as it is by
psychological context. Such a hypothesis would be most strongly
tested in the context of thermoregulation, peripheral arousal,
or hunger given that all of these states can be manipulated to
a reasonable extent without an actual threat or crisis. Thus,
if physiological changes in a safe and otherwise comfortable
environment trigger support seeking and proximity maintaining
behavior, then the embodied approach is likely to be fundamental
to attachment.
In the next section, we suggest that embodied mechanisms
related to homeostasis support attachment behavior and the
balance between proximity seeking and exploratory behaviors.
To explore this embodiment hypothesis, we ﬁrst outline how
proximity maintenance behaviors can be regulated in an
embodied system. Then we discuss what is known about the
mechanisms that support the switch from proximity maintenance
to exploratory behavior, entertaining the notion that the push
and pull dynamic between proximity seeking and exploration
can be understood as an embodied process mediated by non-
representational cognition. Finally we discuss how individual
diﬀerences, the aspect of attachment theory most strongly
related to representational cognition, might emerge not from
representational processes, but through individual diﬀerences
in physiology, and changes in embodied systems through
epigenetics and conditioned learning.
Regulating the Organism’s Social
Baseline Efficiently through
Homeostasis: The Architecture of
Radical Embodiment
In many instances the non-human animal-based neurobiological
literature can sketch the grounds for a radically embodied
framework in humans. Mental representations are rarely used
as mediating mechanisms, and most of the animal literature
instead focuses on how external information, such as touch
or caregiver distance, promotes speciﬁc behavioral responses
from the animal. Moreover, the mediating mechanisms from
perception to action are frequently described at a physiological
level, fully constraining the problem without reference to
computation or representation. Here we seek to provide a
more detailed understanding of the underlying neurobiology,
and point to how representational mechanisms are not (yet)
needed to understand basic attachment mechanisms, ranging
from proximity maintenance (for safety and thermoregulation)
to exploration, a quintessential attachment behavior. From there
we move on to potentially higher order mechanisms that
could integrate radically embodied mechanisms with predictive
control.
Proximity Maintenance and Maintaining
Security
Altricial animals have developed many capacities to signal their
needs related to homeostatic and survival problems. Crying is
a key and useful behavior in studying attachment dynamics
(Bowlby, 1969/1982; Gracanin et al., 2014). In animal research
distress vocalizations are frequently used as a model of crying
(Panksepp, 1998) and have led tractability to questions diﬃcult
to answer in humans. The majority of these processes can
be described without the use of internal representations and
thus suggest many attachment processes don’t require internal
representations to function.
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Most highly social animals go through a multi-phase
response tomaternal separation (Bowlby, 1969/1982;Mineka and
Suomi, 1978). These include a protest phase involving distress
vocalizations, and a despair-phase marked by quiet and depressed
behavior. Both short-term and long-term separation responses
have been heavily studied in animal models using distress
vocalizations. Short-term social isolation in rats is associated with
increased activity, heart rate, respiration, corticosterone release
(a stress substrate), and ultrasonic vocalizations (Shapiro and
Salas, 1970; Hofer, 1984; Stanton et al., 1987). Long-term isolation
is associated with decreases in growth enzymes, heart rate, and
behavior and increases in stress response (Hofer, 1987; Kuhn
et al., 1990; Rosenfeld et al., 1992).
Hofer’s (1987) research suggests that these speciﬁc eﬀects of
isolation can be modiﬁed or eliminated by the introduction of
sensory stimulation mimicking the softness, warmth, and other
sensory features of the dam and littermates (Blumberg et al.,
1992). Thus, sensory information appears to be suﬃcient to
constrain the animal’s behavior in relation to its homeostatic
needs, and no representation appears to be necessary. Moreover,
Harvey and Hennessy (1995) have found an inverse U-shaped
relation between corticotrophin releasing hormone and distress
vocalizations indicating that low and high levels of stress
diminish distress vocalizations. Such a ﬁnding is in line with what
one might predict from an ecological perspective. Vocalizations
and activity should presumably be useful if a caregiver is proximal
enough that proximity maintaining behaviors will elicit help in
time, however, as stress builds, it is more dangerous to continue
vocalization and activity with no response due to the risks of
predation. Thus, high levels of stress may serve to provide
information that the caregiver is not in a position to help, and
therefore radio silence is preferred.
Hofer’s (2006) research has been instrumental in determining
how sensory stimulation socially regulates homeostatic needs in
laboratory animals. Hofer (2006) notes that attachment better
refers to a number of basic processes that tie sensory stimulation
directly to physiological regulation and behavior in a manner
that promotes the formation, regulation, and maintenance of
sustained social relationships. His lab has identiﬁed a critical
mechanism by which odor preferences can be conditioned in
rat pups (Sullivan et al., 1986). Stroking a pup with an artists
brush for 5–15 min while simultaneously presenting it with a
neutral odor leads to clear preferences for the odor during test.
This procedure has been suggested to parallel maternal odor and
maternal grooming behavior.
There are a number of direct behaviors that relate to
homeostatic needs, and neurobiological markers that motivate
the organism. For example, the sensory pattern induced by
maternal grooming behavior is associated with endogenous
opioid release (Panksepp, 1998, also see the discussion below)
in most mammals. Endogenous opioids are critical substrates for
consummatory reward (Levine et al., 1985), which is associated
with bringing the organism back to homeostasis related to
primary drives, such as those governing sex, hunger, and thirst.
Furthermore, ultrasonic vocalizations are also inhibited by opioid
agonists in a variety of species (Herman and Panksepp, 1978;
Kalin et al., 1988; Carden et al., 1991, 1994) with μ-opioid
receptors the likely mediators of this eﬀect. Supporting the
speciﬁcity of these eﬀects, opioid antagonists potentiate distress
vocalizations (Herman and Panksepp, 1978, 1981; Panksepp
et al., 1980b, 1985; Kalin et al., 1988), and milk creates
the analgesic and behavioral eﬀects associated with opiate
administration (Smotherman and Robinson, 1987; Blass and
Fitzgerald, 1988).
One can imagine that sensory information such as odor and
touch get integrated. From there, reward gets associated with
odor through opioid or other reinforcement mechanisms, and
behavioral approach motor outputs are associated with odor in
the brain. The odor stimulus thus becomes directly paired with
an approach motor output, making the odor an attractor for the
animal. As this example indicates, much of this process requires
no mediating representation to understand the regulation of
homeostasis. Further, this description has the added beneﬁt of
greater speciﬁcity regarding the process, and allows for greater
understanding and control of attachment behaviors than would
traditional representational approaches.
In humans, Coan et al. (2006, 2013) and Johnson et al. (2013)
have found that handholding diminishes the neural response to
threat. In these studies a reliable network of brain regions are
activated to the threat of shock. Generally, activity in this network
is reduced in the partner handholding condition (sometimes the
partners are friends, other times romantic partners), and the
extent to which there are reductions in activity is related to
the quality of the relationship. Cognitive neuroscience models
typically predict that such eﬀects will be the result of neural
regions involved in emotion regulation, facilitated by internal
working models, becoming more active and down-regulating
the threat matrix. Yet, numerous studies (Coan et al., 2006,
2013; Johnson et al., 2013) have found no increased activation
in self-regulatory regions, nor any other brain region. This
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that it is not that
social contact necessarily diminishes the threat response per
se, but rather scales perception of the threat so that the
threat response is muted. While this can be mediated through
physiological changes, it is also hypothesized that this muting
is also a function of perceptual scaling of the magnitude of the
threat.
One of the prime indicators that proximity is at a neutral,
and desired, level is body temperature. This is probably because
lack of appropriate thermoregulation in people means certain
death (Blatteis, 2001). In human infants this is particularly critical
as they lack the surface to body ratio to self-regulate their
temperature in the same manner as adults. Thus, human parents
provide the infant with an essential source of thermoregulation.
In fact, skin-to-skin contact (as compared to swaddling in a cloth)
leads to less skin temperature reduction just after being born
(Bystrova et al., 2003). Speciﬁcally, adults help infants stay in
a “thermoneutral zone” (i.e., to maintain homeostasis; Cannon,
1929), while simultaneously reducing the net energetic expense of
warming the body. Further, the secretion of oxytocin, a precursor
to the process that leads to vasodilation and increases in skin
temperature, helps in reducing the total energy expense of two
individuals by activating the endocrine system (Eriksson et al.,
1994). Thus, social contact maintains a kind of temperature
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homeostasis in the most bioenergetically eﬃcient manner (see
also IJzerman et al., 2015b).
Examples of social thermoregulation exist in the animal and
human literatures, and, again, there are physiological correlates
that should be able to explain many classical attachment eﬀects.
For example, individual diﬀerences may point to mediating
representations, but there may be physiological diﬀerences
between individuals that could also explain such eﬀects. That
is, hairless mice produce less brown adipose tissue (BAT)
during cold snaps if they aggregate with other individuals.
Producing less BAT helps them manage temperature and leads
to savings in bioenergetics by decreasing the need for fat stores,
and, in turn, the development of one’s body may contribute
to social interactions later in life. Similarly, marmots have a
signiﬁcantly higher chance of survival if huddling (crucial to
social thermoregulation) occurs with the co-presence of lower
ranking marmots in the group (Armitage, 1999).
Notably, all of these examples describe direct processes for
proximity maintenance (in service of homeostasis), eliminating
the need for internal representations. The proximity of
conspeciﬁcs is critical for an animal’s assessment of its energetic
balance, and its ability to meet homeostatic needs and thus
scales perception of the environment in proportion to those
resources. As such, social proximity is a signal that the animal
may switch from defensive processes and focus on aﬃliation
and/or exploration. But how does that switch occur, and can the
switch ﬂip via embodied processes?
Moving to Exploration and Energetics
Porges (2007) argues for a distinction between two segments
of the vagal nerve, one evolutionarily newer, and one older.
The phylogenetically newer vagus serves as a brake by which
vagal output to the heart allows the animal to switch between a
mobilized state and a calm state (Porges, 2007). When vagal tone
is high, the vagus inhibits heart rate, but low vagal tone releases
this break resulting in disinhibition. Thus, the vagal system is
central to the peripheral control of the action state of mammals.
This adaptation allows an animal to engage in behaviors that
would be dangerous with a strictly reptilian vagus. Organisms
have three types of reactive defense behaviors that signiﬁcantly
and rapidly alter autonomic nervous system function, ﬁght, ﬂight,
and freezing (Porges, 2011). Fight and ﬂight both involve an
increase in sympathetic output, mobilizing resources for vigorous
muscle movement and physical action. Freezing, alternatively,
involves immobilization with fear. This state can be accompanied
with dramatic and dangerous drops in heart rate and blood
pressure. Social engagement (e.g., sex, breastfeeding, childbirth)
requires a level of immobilization without fear, or staying calm
in the presence of and in interactions with others. Porges (2007,
2011) believes the mammalian vagus to have evolved just for such
functions.
Moving onto how the organism engages in exploratory
behavior, it helps understanding the role of the hormone
oxytocine (OT). OT may be critical in regulating which part
of the vagus is active, and the downstream functions of the
vagus. Oxytocin is a peptide hormone that functions as a
neuromodulator in the CNS (Carter, 2014). OT is released during
social engagement of various kinds (Wakerley and Lincoln,
1973; Keverne et al., 1983; Uvnas-Moberg et al., 1993) including
nursing, vibrotactile, and thermal stimulation. Notably, OT has
an excitatory eﬀect on social motivation as it is associated with the
onset of maternal behavior, increased sexual response, grooming
behavior, and physical contact (Pedersen and Prange, 1979;
Argiolas et al., 1987; Gorzalka and Lester, 1987; Witt et al., 1990;
Witt and Insel, 1991; Winslow and Insel, 1993; Pedersen et al.,
1994).
Furthermore, OT is now well documented to be a critical
mediating mechanism in vole pair bonding (Cho et al., 1999;
Bales et al., 2004). It mediates maternal behavior (Bosch and
Neuman, 2012), protects against negative consequences of social
isolation (Grippo et al., 2009), and is critical in both birth
and lactation (Carter, 1998). In humans, oxytocin has been
related to many social behaviors as in other mammals, but
also more “abstract” sociality such as that found in economic
trust games (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Zak et al., 2007). Recent
studies have begun to reveal a direct link between OT and
the other previously mentioned homeostatic processes, namely
thermoregulation and metabolism (Kasahara et al., 2007, 2013;
Takayanagi et al., 2008; Chaves et al., 2013). Chaves et al. (2013)
found support that OT has inhibitory eﬀects on carbohydrate
preferences and is associated with rectal temperatures. In line
with these ﬁndings Katsuhiko Nishimori and colleagues note that
OT receptor knockout mice have higher rates of obesity later
in life (Takayanagi et al., 2008) and impaired thermoregulation
capacities (Kasahara et al., 2007). Moreover, those deﬁcits
can be eliminated with the introduction of OT receptors in
thermoregulatory regions of the hypothalamus. This research
suggests that social contact might have important downstream
implications regarding the expenditure of energy on exploratory
activities. Indeed, we suggest that OT and the vagus are important
in this process, acting as a bridge between defensive states and
calm states, and are key mediators of the switch from defensive
behavior, proximity seeking behavior, and exploratory behavior.
This review suggests that the basic mechanisms involved
in attachment behavior can be understood without mediating
representations. At its core, attachment is about harm avoidance,
thermoregulation, and the switch from maintaining security
toward exploratory states. The more we learn about the
neurobiological mechanisms that control such behavior, the
clearer it becomes thatmediating representations are unnecessary
to explain this behavior. As such, the normative processes that
support attachment do not seem to require a representational
architecture, but what about individual diﬀerences? The biggest
challenge for a radical embodiment account of attachment is
the development of individual diﬀerence. Individual diﬀerences
in attachment, more than any other element, are understood
explicitly as representational in nature. Next we discuss how
embodied processes can also explain these aspects of attachment
relationships.
Embodiment of Individual Differences in
Attachment
Normative attachment processes can be understood quite well
from an embodied perspective. Yet, it is within the study of
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attachment styles that representations come to the fore. A simple
search for “attachment representation” in any scholarly search
tool will produce hundreds, if not 1000, of papers with a
central theme of the representation of individual diﬀerences in
attachment. For example, Sroufe (2005, p. 365) notes that “Not
only does representation mediate the eﬀect of prior experience
on later adaptation, later experience and adaptation impact
representation.” The one particularly important issue to address
before accepting attachment as radically embodied is individual
diﬀerences.
Thus far, we have argued that many processes in attachment
are primarily homeostatic in nature. Many homeostatic
mechanisms, like those that control eating and sex, are not based
on a ﬁxed set-point, but rather on the positive-incentive value
of the behavior (see Berridge, 2004). From this perspective, any
of the physiological systems in which attachment behavior helps
regulate will act as a signal to gain social contact. Given that no
set-point assumption is necessary, the fact that individuals vary
on how much they seek social contact, and the relative reward
value of that contact for the individual is not surprising. Many
of these earlier eﬀects may well be explained through systematic
diﬀerences in the organism’s physiology.
That is, physiological and sensory cues of safety versus
environmental challenge may underlie the triggers for
attachment behavior. Thus, the baseline activity, strength,
and potency of underlying neural substrates might be the ﬁrst
and most important way in which individual diﬀerences in
attachment behavior emerge. For example, opioid tone might
inﬂuence overall attachment and social behavior (Panksepp,
1998). Low opioid tone may be associated with excessive social
support seeking, just as the introduction of opioid antagonists
produces social behavior in social animals (Herman and
Panksepp, 1978; Panksepp et al., 1980a; Keverne et al., 1989).
Moreover, low opioid tone has been demonstrated in individuals
with borderline personality disorder (Ripoll et al., 2013), and
activity in the A118G polymorphism of the mu-opioid receptor
gene has been associated with avoidant attachment, aﬀectionate
relationships, and sensitivity to social reward (Troisi et al., 2010).
Diﬀerences in oxytocin function may also be critical
in determining attachment behavior. For example, oxytocin
receptor gene (OXTR) variation is associated with prosocial
behavior (Israel et al., 2009), empathy and stress reactivity
(Rodrigues et al., 2009), pair bonding (Walum et al., 2011),
parenting behavior (Bakermans-Kranenburg and van Ijzendoorn,
2011), emotional loneliness (Lucht et al., 2009), and functional
links between hypothalamic and limbic system activity in
emotional face processing (Tost et al., 2010). Epigenetic variation
in methylation of the OXTR gene is similarly associated with
neural responses to ambiguous social stimuli (Jack et al.,
2012), autism and callous-unemotional traits (Gregory et al.,
2009; Kumsta et al., 2013). Similarly, the work by McGowan
et al. (2009) indicates that methylation of the hippocampal
glucocorticoid receptor gene is inﬂuenced by social factors and
inﬂuences exploratory behavior and stress responses well into
adulthood.
Although the individual diﬀerence component of attachment
is the part of attachment theory and relationship theories
more broadly that are most consistent with representational
mediating processes, this discussion points to several possible
avenues through which representation is unnecessary for the
emergence of individual diﬀerences. From this perspective
homeostatic mechanisms based on positive-incentive value (and
therefore related conditioning processes as well; see Beckes
et al., 2010, 2013; Beckes and Coan, 2014) can explain a
great deal of variation in attachment behavior. Moreover, the
patterns of early attachment relationships laying a foundation
for later development are clearly identiﬁable with this approach
through the development of physiological diﬀerences, epigenetic
processes, and conditioned learning.
How does this work for exploration beyond the direct social
environment, and for prediction of the future? Many attachment
behaviors should be about predicting future events as much
as reacting to current events. In addition, the switch from
maintaining security to exploratory behaviors has important
downstream implications regarding the expenditure of energy on
exploratory activities, and SBT (Beckes and Coan, 2011) suggests
that diﬀerences in attachment are important in budgeting
energetic resources for exploration, as energy is highly sensitive
to social resources. Indeed, humans have a great capacity
for prospective cognition, often thinking about future events,
possible outcomes, the perspectives of others, and removing
themselves cognitively from the immediate environment. If
cognition is solely driven by the interaction between the organism
and its environment, how does such internally driven cognition
emerge?
Individual Differences: The Need for
Prospection
The biggest challenge for radical embodiment theories is to
move from exploration to prediction. How do temperature
predictions, for example, relate to skin temperature changes?
Are such notions predicated upon the idea of representing
abstract concepts, as postulated by Lakoﬀ and Johnson (1999)?
One hallmark study by Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) found
that time can be grounded in the concrete experience of space.
However, Srinivasan and Carey (2010) found that comparable
time-space eﬀects are already detected in preverbal infants. Thus,
such abstract representations might be explainable through either
embodied processes, or a process of scaﬀolding (see also IJzerman
and Koole, 2011; IJzerman et al., 2015b).
Scaﬀolding theories suggest that associations between social
experiences and bodily conditions create the groundwork for
later models of the world (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969; Mandler,
2004; Williams et al., 2009). Physical contact between two
bodies creates a number of bodily states that serve as the
basis for grounded relationship metaphors. Contact through
sex, breastfeeding, hugging, handholding, and intimate contact
all produce sensory stimulation of mechanoreceptors and
thermoreceptors in the skin. Indeed, the link between softness
and warmth on the one hand, and basic social contact on the
other may be both genetically prepared and heavily reinforced
early on in life, and re-presented in attachment styles later in
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life (Caporael, 1997; Damasio, 1999; Fiske, 2004; Cohen and
Leung, 2009; IJzerman and Semin, 2010; IJzerman and Cohen,
2011). This presents at least two important questions. How
much of attachment is radically embodied and how much is
representational? And how might scaﬀolding occur?
To date it is unclear how scaﬀolding could occur. One
potential candidate is the theory of PARCSs (Tops and Boksem,
2011; Tops et al., 2014), which suggests two levels of control,
one predictive and one reactive. According to PARCS, radical
embodiment may be the rule for reactive control systems,
however, predictive control systems are re-presentational in
nature. From this perspective motivational control can be shifted
between predictive systems and reactive systems, which allows for
representational inﬂuence on behavior, but that representational
structure is fundamentally connected with an embodied reactive
control system. In this way the representational architecture of
the mind (a soft representation; Zajonc andMarkus, 1984) is built
in close association with the embodied architecture, which leads
to this scaﬀolding phenomenon. A touch from another person
may thus contribute not only to the feeling that the world is
secure, but that the environment also has suﬃcient resources.
From that perspective, the organism can make predictions about
what future action to take. This approach thus allows for clear
predictions about when representational processes are being
used, and the neural mechanisms that support them. In order
to elucidate this idea, we now explore how radically embodied
cognitive systems interact with representationally based cognitive
systems, and how representational systems may have evolved to
support relationship cognition.
Integration of Radical Embodiment and
Representation: Theory of Predictive and
Reactive Control Systems
One fascinating ﬁnding is that maternal thermoregulation in
rats may lead to greater brain growth. And, we know that
secure attachment styles are related to greater self-complexity in
humans (e.g., Mikulincer, 1995). Could it be that on top of the
proposed radically embodied architecture, there are predictive
models for the beneﬁt of greater exploration? This idea of
stable individual diﬀerence patterns of attachment behavior has
always been one of the hallmark features of attachment theory.
Notably, Bowlby (1969/1982) theorized that these diﬀerences –
and their stability throughout life – were due to internal
working models, or representations of the relationship with the
caregiver.
One possibility is that the brain has evolved additional
systems for representational cognition that rely on radically
embodied architectures in the brain, in part because of an
increase in sociality over evolutionary time. Notably, brain size
and the size of social groups across mammals, particularly
primates, are positively correlated (Barrett et al., 2002) in such
a way as to indicate a link between neocortical volume and
sociality that is meaningful. Dunbar and Shultz (2007) argue that
this relationship was promoted because increased social group
size and monogamous pair-bonding required greater predictive
capacity to navigate social relationships. Indeed, it may be
that in evolutionary history greater sociality led to pressures
that promoted increased cortical growth while simultaneously
increasing energetic eﬃciency through social cooperation.
Why might this be the case? We think that the human
brain evolved greater prospective/predictive capacities in order to
promote planning and simulation of possible outcomes due to an
increase in the need to predict the behavior of others that emerged
with increased sociality, like more complex “meta-relationships”
(Fiske, 2012; Bohl, 2014). In order to predict the future of
relationships and social partnerships, greater prospective capacity
became essential so that one could make appropriate tradeoﬀs
between current outcomes at a selﬁsh level and the potentially
greater reward from working cooperatively with others, more or
less like a “weather report” of the social environment (IJzerman
et al., 2015b). This tradeoﬀ and balance requires the ability
to determine the trustworthiness of others and predict their
behavior as a function of varied situations. This happens in
two ways. First, predictive cognition was promoted and, as a
function, brain size likely grew. Moreover, increased cooperative
behavior also promoted energetic eﬃciency – a positive weather
report – allowing for greater exploration of the environment,
promoting multiple levels of switches, controlled in part via
OT mechanisms, between exploratory and defensive behavior,
and predictive (representational) and reactive (embodied)
cognition.
In line with this reasoning, PARCS suggests that reactive
control systems evolved early in evolutionary history for the
purpose of behavioral control in unpredictable environments.
This system is composed of lateral limbic system structures such
as the ventral striatum (VS), anterior hippocampal formation,
and amygdala, as well as ventrolateral cortical structures such
as the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and anterior insula (AI).
This system is thought to specialize in the processing of
novelty, (cf., Whalen, 2007), biological salience (cf., Adolphs,
2010), and urgent environmental stimuli in order to react to
exigencies. It functions in a feedback-guided manner to the
immediate situation and focuses attention narrowly on the local
situation. Thus, when the organism is lonely, it will likely seek
for warm and protective others. In this manner the organism
can take new information and communicate with predictive
systems to update internal predictive models promoting greater
predictive control in the future (Hasher and Zacks, 1979;
Tops and Boksem, 2011).
Predictive control systems, on the other hand, are comprised
of dorsomedial structures such as the posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC), precuneous, angular gyrus, parahippocampal cortex,
posterior hippocampal formation, medial prefrontal cortex, and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. It is believed that this network
of systems is largely an outgrowth of evolutionary pressures
that emerged in highly predictable and stable environments
(Tops et al., 2014). This system supports a variety of cognitive
functions that might be representational in nature, and is highly
intertwined with the reactive system. PARCS theorizes that the
system is largely composed of neural structures intrinsic to the
default mode network (DMN), such as the posterior cingulate,
precuneous, medial temporal lobe, and medial prefrontal cortex
(Raichle et al., 2001) as well as dorsal executive regions. It is
involved in cognitive tasks with internally focused attention such
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as imagining a diﬀerent time or space (Buckner and Carroll,
2007), or another person’s perspective (Waytz and Mitchell,
2011). Craik (1943) suggested that imagining the future using
internal models allows for testing alternative possibilities, and
making better predictions regarding situational outcomes. In the
same sense, PARCS suggests that the dorsal predictive system
function is to run simulations to predict future events, and,
in line with the rest of our paper, likely to “gage” the amount
of resources available (see also IJzerman et al., 2015a). Thus,
the dorsal predictive system engages in creating internal models
that predict future outcomes through simulation, and updates
those models slowly, in line with the idea that it responds to
environmental predictability.
A key idea is that the predictive control system creates
simulations largely based on information from embodied
sources. Thus, much of the brain may function in a radically
embodied manner, but predictive control has required a form
of representational architecture that uses simulation processes,
and engages in computational processes. Soft representations are
scaﬀolded upon embodied architecture, but still, nonetheless,
may exist, and be the basis of internal working models. In order
to test such a hypothesis, falsiﬁable predictions must be produced
that can be used to challenge this model.
Solving the Puzzle
In order to determine which way of thinking about attachment
is most accurate, one must develop alternative hypotheses that
can be derived from each approach. Some possible ways of
looking at extant data could provide compelling evidence for one
alternative or the other with supplementation of a few critical
experiments. Another possibility is that we have not developed
enough knowledge of the underlying systems to move to a
fully radically embodied approach. As Chemero (2009) notes,
mediating representations are often used as placeholders until
a system is understood with enough ﬁdelity that one no longer
needs those placeholders. But what does the current evidence
indicate?
Current Evidence and Competing
Alternatives
The key to distinguishing which alternative is more accurate,
the PARCS model or the radically embodied model, may lie
in the exigencies of the situation. If soft representations are
scaﬀolded onto embodied processes, but are primarily for
adapting to predictable circumstances, then the predictability of
the circumstance is likely the key distinguishing variable between
the control of internal working models and radically embodied
processes. From this, one can assume that reactive control
will become dominant in distressing circumstances, whereas
predictive control should be dominant in non- or eustressful
circumstances (Selye, 1974). From there, speciﬁc hypotheses
can be devised to challenge each approach to determine if the
empirical facts ﬁt the theoretical model.
Current research regarding internal working models provides
clear support for a reactive system, which does not require
internal representational structures. For example, conditioned
learning procedures have been used to create attachment
associations in implicit paradigms that appear to require no
underlying representational mediation, and are instead built on
basic associational and reinforcement processes (e.g., Beckes
et al., 2010, 2013). Moreover, the idea that predictive systems
(internal working models) are critical in acute attachment
behavior is questionable given that diﬀerential attachment
behavior tends to emerge during situations of distress, when
the reactive system should be dominant (Simpson and Rholes,
2012). For example, Simpson et al. (1992) found that behavioral
diﬀerences between avoidant and secure women did not emerge
without fear or anxiety. Similarly, Simpson et al. (1996) found
that the quality of a conﬂict discussion was related to attachment
anxiety only in circumstances in which couples were discussing
a major problem, and thus experiencing acute distress. These
ﬁndings are core to Simpson and Rholes (2012) diathesis
stress model of attachment, suggesting that attachment styles
really emerge in distressing circumstances, with few observable
diﬀerences between anxious, avoidant, and secure people in low
stress circumstances.
This provides intriguing support for the PARCS approach.
On the one hand, internal working models appear to emerge in
conditions in which one would expect the reactive control system
to be the primary driver of behavior. This would suggest that
attachment styles are largely reactive, and therefore embodied.
Alternatively, it also indicates that in low stress circumstances a
calmer, potentially predictive system, may be guiding behavior.
This indicates that the predictive system exists, and that internal
representational processes may be involved in attachment, but
that they do not matter much in terms of mediating behavior in
circumstances that are acutely distressing.
In this context, it is important to note that stress is not
equivalent with unpredictability. Early experiences may
determine whether challenges or environments are perceived
as predictable. Or, whether there are internal models available
to meet the challenge. Insecurely attached individuals will
tend to revert to reactive control when challenged, while
securely attached individuals may sustain predictive control
(and predictive homeostasis) enabling them to activate
internal working models. This dissociation between stress
and predictability may be shown in oxytocin function: OT is
usually associated with anxiolytic eﬀects, but intranasal OT
increased anxiety in response to an unpredictable stressor
(Grillon et al., 2013).
One possibility consistent with PARCS is that attachment
security may require the action of the predictive system, having
emerged out of predictable attachment relationships, whereas
insecure attachment is largely controlled by the reactive system.
Such a conceptualization would ﬁt with the extant literature
regarding stress-diathesis (Simpson and Rholes, 2012). From this
perspective, distress induced attachment behavior starts from
reactive control, but shifts to predictive control in the case of
secure attachment (Tops et al., 2014). There are a few strong
hypotheses one can make if the PARCS prediction is correct.
Each type of prediction can be organized by methodological
approaches, each of which can be used to test critical predictions
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from the PARCS model. First, the hypothesis that predictive
control systems update slowly relative to reactive systems, and
that secure attachment is predictive whereas insecure is reactive,
provides an opportunity to test the PARCs model using learning
methods, and in particular conditioning paradigms. Second, the
hypothesis that secure individuals should perceive challenges as
more predictable, and shift to predictive control relatively quickly
can be tested using neuroimaging and psychophysiological
methods looking at the relative activity and time course response
of lateralized brain activity, medial prefrontal regions, AI, and
posterior insula. Third, the prediction that the reactive system is
radically embodied can be used to predict enhanced eﬀects during
an unpredictable stressor in an embodiment paradigm.
Conditioning Paradigms
If the PARCs prediction that secure attachment is prospectively
controlled and representational, whereas insecure attachment
is reactively controlled and non-representational is correct,
then secure and insecure attachment associations should be
variably modiﬁable using conditioning procedures. As PARCS
notes, predictive models are updated more slowly, and are
thus more resistant to change relative to reactive models. If
true, secure representations and associations should be harder
to eliminate than insecure representations. Laboratory methods
have been used to manipulate attachment styles using negative
reinforcement (e.g., Beckes et al., 2010, 2013). In these studies
a threatening stimulus (e.g., images of snakes, shock threats)
is paired with the images of another individual in a manner
that produces negative reinforcement as measured by attentional
biases and lexical decision measures using faces as primes for
attachment relevant words. Presentation of the faces occurs after
the oﬀset of the negative stimulus, or presented after an operant
procedure in which the person asks for help (from the person
in the photo) while under threat of shock, pain, or another
negative stimulus. Consistent, warm responses (continuous
reinforcement) in such procedures produces secure associations
with novel faces. If, however, the other is inconsistently
responsive, producing a variable ratio reinforcement schedule,
such a procedure should produce anxious/ambivalent attachment
associations and hyper support seeking behavior. It could be
possible to use such a procedure repeatedly to produce such
attachment associations and then test the ease with which one can
shift those associations in later trials, predicting that insecurity is
easier to shift than security.
Alternatively, and more externally valid, one could use
such techniques to see if people’s attachment styles in a
speciﬁc relationship are modiﬁable through such procedures, and
compare the relative ease of modifying such styles in secure vs.
insecure individuals. Moreover, one might be able to use the
basic principles in more realistic situations, further improving
external validity, such as producing situations in which each
person is reliant on the other to avoid some undesirable
outcome. In addition, researchers could use such principles to
alter attachment dynamics in intact relationships. For example,
emotionally focused therapy (e.g., Johnson et al., 2013) has at
its core a process of training partners in distressed relationships
how to respond consistently to their partner’s needs. Research
into this method of intervention indicates that such an approach
produces decreases in attachment insecurity, and improvements
in social emotion regulation over a reasonable period of time.
Additionally, one might be able to use physical warmth cues
as an unconditioned reinforcer in some situations. Raison et al.
(2015) propose full body warmth as a treatment modality for
aﬀective disorders. It could also be an eﬀective method of
promoting security in attachment relationships if the partner
is paired with hyperthermia consistently over a period of time.
Finally, one could track intact relationships over time measuring
responsiveness during stressful situations, attachment styles, and
changes in those dynamics to see if changes in responsiveness
predict more change in insecure individual’s attachment styles
relative to secure individuals.
Neuroimaging and Psychophysiological
Methods
Using PARCs, one can predict speciﬁc patterns of response from
neurobiological measures. As noted above, challenges should
lead to predictive control more easily for secure individuals
than for insecure individuals. Moreover, when confronted with
a challenge, secure individuals should react with reactive systems,
but rapidly switch to predictive control using predictive models
to cope with the challenges. For example, when faced with
an acute stressor secure individuals should show a shift from
right hemisphere control to left hemisphere control, and then
to dorsomedial control over time (Tops et al., 2014). This is
consistent with going from right hemisphere reactive emergency
control (orienting, vigilance, etc.), to left hemisphere reactive
control in coping (e.g., reappraisal), to predictive control (medial
mechanisms). One might predict, for example, a more intense
AI activation and slower switch to medial prefrontal activation
in insecure individuals relative to secure individuals, indicating
less contextualized perception of threat in those individuals.
These questions could be explored regressing attachment security
on BOLD activity of AI and medial prefrontal regions in an
fMRI threat paradigm. Such a prediction should be most evident
when an individual is faced with a social or relationship threat.
Several diﬀerent types of paradigms could be employed to test
such a hypothesis. For example, using EEG one might ﬁnd
that relationship threats produce relatively greater left frontal
alpha power shortly after the threat, but over time that shifts to
relatively greater right frontal alpha power in secure individuals
more quickly than in insecure individuals (see Coan and Allen,
2003).
Notably, the eﬀects of embodiment manipulations through
reactive and predictive systems may further depend on
the required level of diﬀerentiation and contextualization
of interoceptive information. Reactive control in emergency
situations is associated with an integrated perception of
momentary resources and arousal in the AI, at the cost of
diﬀerentiated perception in the posterior insula. By relating
the diﬀerentiated viscerosensory representations in the posterior
insula to the predictive control system, PARCS suggests that
activation of these areas relates to increased interoceptive self-
observation skills and ﬁne-tuning of perception and internal
state. For instance, a recent study found that the response
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FIGURE 1 | It provides a simplified version of the proposed neural
mechanisms of attachment, from input (perception) to processing
(mediating neural mechanisms) to output (behavior) of the entire
spectrum of what we understand as “attachment.” The figure is
necessarily simplified for the sake of supporting our written description. For
example, bidirectional flow is assumed, but not depicted. Input related to
homeostatic imbalance promotes stress system activity with frequent release of
oxytocin promoting its output (e.g., defensive behaviors), and this relationship is
mediated by relevant neurobiological mechanisms central to reactive control
(ventrolateral structures). Input related to homeostatic balance push output (e.g.,
exploration or reparative behaviors) toward predictive control composed of
primarily of dorsomedial structures.
of the taste-sensitive region of the posterior insula to food
images was directly related to the body’s homeostatic state
as indexed by levels of peripheral glucose (Simmons et al.,
2013). By contrast, PARCS predicts that urgency, emergency,
and unpredictability activate reactive control and the AI and
suppress predictive control. For instance acute stress and reactive
control inhibit and subsequently increase food intake (Bazhan
and Zelena, 2013), while predictive homeostatic control matches
hunger feeling to energetic state and circadian rhythm (Moore-
Ede, 1986; Simmons et al., 2013). The association of reactive
control with anxiety explains why anxiety is associated with
increased undiﬀerentiated awareness of arousal (physiological
activation; Pollatos et al., 2007) but less diﬀerentiated awareness
of speciﬁc somatic states (somatic neglect; Koole et al., 2014).
It also explains the negative correlations of trait internal state
awareness with social anxiety, depression, psychological distress,
and external control, and more accurate and extensive self-
knowledge (Watson et al., 1996; Trapnell and Campbell, 1999;
Ghorbani et al., 2004; Takano and Tanno, 2009). This provides
a way in which neuroimaging methods, by investigating insular
involvement in embodied processes (posterior vs. anterior),
might be used in combination with embodiment approaches to
further test the PARCs model.
Embodiment Paradigms
Finally, one might predict that embodiedmanipulations will have
stronger inﬂuences on behavioral responses when unpredictable
stress is higher, particularly in insecure individuals. The
manipulation of the stress and predictability of the situation,
with the embodiment of a representation might oﬀer some
compelling examples of how and whether predictive systems
interact with embodied systems. For example, the embodiment
eﬀects of a warm cup of coﬀee increasing the perceived warmth of
another person (see Williams and Bargh, 2008) may be stronger
if manipulated during a period of unpredictable shock threat or
after a brief and unpredictable stressor.
As these example indicate, several types of hypotheses can
be generated to diﬀerentiate a PARCs approach to a radically
embodied approach. Although the jury is still out on which
theoretical approach is better at capturing the data, such
predictions give us a set of tractable questions to begin testing
this question.
Conclusion
Herein we have described a number of psychological and
neurobiological processes related to attachment from a radically
embodied perspective (see Figure 1). Many aspects of attachment
are well suited to be described and understood from a non-
representational perspective and should be much better explored
than they currently have been – preferably through dynamical
models. Speciﬁc sensory systems have been linked to many
of the physiological eﬀects of social contact, with diﬀerent
sensory and nutritive stimuli regulating peripheral physiology
in predictable manners. Further, neural systems involved in
responding to social isolation and separation are similar in
structure to physical pain circuits, regulated by the same opioid
mechanisms. Also, mammals appear to have social speciﬁc
functions related to the regulation of visceral organs and
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communication social communication processes through the
vagus nerve. This parasympathetic circuit directly ties perception
of social targets to the regulation of metabolic, stress, and
emotion circuits. Moreover, this system appears to have OT
controls located in the amygdala, hypothalamus, and directly
in the brainstem nuclei that the vagus originates in. OT
itself is intrinsically linked with the control of social behavior,
thermoregulation, and metabolic processes indicating even more
signiﬁcant overlap in the neural bases of these systems. We
suggest a theoretical approach to thinking about the nature and
function of human sociality rooted in conservation of metabolic
resources and diminishing the need for environmental defense
behaviors. This approach takes a Gibsonian view that social
relationships provide aﬀordances to act, or not in some cases,
and that removal of those aﬀordances from the environment
makes action more challenging, scary, and threatening. Finally,
we argue that individual diﬀerences in attachment styles
need not be conceptualized as representational constructs,
but can be thought of as response tendencies that emerge
out the person’s unique biological makeup and their learning
history.
Disentangling the degree to which processes are
representational or computational or not is a simple task. New
models that propose a combination of such approaches such as
PARCS (Tops and Boksem, 2011) oﬀer a compelling alternative
to the all or none approach often represented in the current
debates over embodiment. We have endeavored to oﬀer a view
of attachment that promotes thinking about the underlying
cognitive and neurobiological processes in novel ways, and
expands the toolkit we use to approach questions surrounding
attachment. The individual and competing hypotheses presented
herein should act as a guide to further spark innovation and
exploration in this important ﬁeld of study. In the end all we can
do is pursue the question, to what degree is attachment radically
embodied?
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